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The Philosophy of Mythology 
(Early German Philosophers’ Theories of Myth and the Symbol) 
 
Forthcoming as: 
“The Philosophy of Mythology.” A Companion to Early German Romantic Philosophy, 
E. Milán and J. Norman eds. (Brill, in press). 
 
 
 The early German romantic philosophy of myth can help elucidate the nature of 
romanticism itself, which notoriously resists descriptive or theoretical definition. To be 
sure, myth is an equally problematic term, whose precise meaning varies among romantic 
philosophers, though its role in the romantic project remains usefully consistent: myth is 
offered as a solution to the crisis of modern alienation, or, more radically, to the crisis of 
the subject object dichotomy. The sources of this alienation are likewise varied but 
broadly coherent. I will mention those relevant to the task at hand. 
 Given the intimate association between romantic philosophy and aesthetic theory, 
it is unsurprising that a central concern of romantic authors is a presumed diminution in 
the immediacy of experience and expression as a defining feature of the modern 
condition. Central to both issues is the problematic nature of language itself—a problem 
thought to be exacerbated by the development of rational and abstract thought—which 
imposes itself between us and the world about us, as the mental activity responding to 
sensory experience and communicating that response to others. By extension, the 
sentimental artist could also impose himself between objects and perceiving subjects. 
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This problematic loss of immediacy was further exacerbated by Kant’s first critique, with 
its foreclosure on human ability to directly experience things in themselves.1 Mankind is 
thus trapped in the world of subjective phenomena conditioned by the a priori categories 
of understanding, and thereby separated by an unbridgeable gulf from an unknowable 
absolute. 
 The romantics believed, however, that the first men enjoyed a oneness with 
experience, and specifically with nature, that was lacking in civilized Europe. For this, 
civilization itself was held accountable, including the rise of the modern city and 
capitalist economy. The latter also serves to alienate man from other men through the 
division of labor, and also from himself as he sells his body in exchange for sustenance. 
Again the problem was exacerbated by philosophical intervention, in the present case the 
mind body dualism of Descartes that left our very being fragmented. Science also 
contributed to man’s alienation from nature, with the mechanistic worldview ushered in 
by the Copernican revolution and dramatically strengthened by Newton’s demonstration 
of physical laws governing nature: his law of gravity establishing an inverse quadratic 
relationship between two bodies, F = Gm1m2/r2, silenced the music of the spheres. 
 Man is further alienated from his fellow man by the fragmentation of religion 
begun by Avignon papacy (1309-1378) and protestant reformation (from Luther’s posting 
of his 95 theses in 1517 to approximately the end of the Thirty Years War). Together 
with the triumph of modern science the rise of personal religion helped produce a decline 
in church attendance throughout Europe. Religious fragmentation was coupled with and 
reinforced the political fragmentation of Europe, which reached a crisis with the Thirty 
Years War that ravaged Europe from 1618 to 1648. The war led to centuries of mutual 
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suspicion and conflicts that pitted protestants against Catholics, and the north against the 
south, and that continue to the present day in economic terms. In Germany, the sense of 
political fragmentation was compounded by its failure to achieve political union before 
1871, leaving it a loose conglomeration of minor states. Finally, one should note that the 
cultural fragmentation of Europe was abetted by adoption of the vernacular in 
professional discourse and scholarship. 
 In offering myth as the solution to all these dislocations, the romantics were 
obviously making enormous claims for the power of a narrative genre that had no name 
in the ancient world and was essentially invented as such by Heyne. Yet it was felt that 
myth gave the ancient world its cultural coherency, and was a key to restoring coherency 
to the contemporary world. It also expressed primitive man’s rapport with nature, and 
could help modern man restore his oneness with a nature reanimated by Spinoza-inspired 
pantheism. Above all, myth could restore immediacy of experience and expression. In 
contrast with modern thought, the language of myth was held to be concrete, highly 
affective and unencumbered by extensive learning and ratiocination. Spectacular 
imaginative leaps among the first men were not simply possible but rendered necessary 
by the impoverishment of language, knowledge and logic. By virtue of being a symbolic, 
intuitive mode, myth could, to various degrees, narrow the gap between signifier and 
signified, between consciousness and the objects of consciousness. At its limit, and 
despite Kant’s strictures, myth could even give modern man access to transcendental 
reality. 
 The symbol is a key to the power of myth, and claims made for its powers are 
even more portentous than those for myth itself. Given the uses to which it is put by 
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romantic thinkers, it is ironic that the symbol has its origins in two passages from Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment (Critik der Urteilskraft).2 First, Kant argues that in contrast to the 
concepts of understanding (Verstand) which admit of sensible illustration—e.g., a square 
can be represented by four lines connecting at each end in right angles—concepts of 
reason (Vernunft) do not, and can only be illustrated to sense indirectly—e.g., justice can 
be represented as a beautiful blindfolded woman holding scales and a sword. Kant’s term 
for a concrete illustration of an abstract concept is “symbolic hypotyposis.”3 The visual 
nature of the symbol has a lasting legacy among romantic thinkers. 
 In a separate passage, Kant defines genius as: 
 
the faculty of presenting aesthetical Ideas. And by an aesthetical Idea I 
understand that representation of the Imagination (Vorstellung der 
Einbildungskraft) which occasions much thought, without, however, any definite 
thought, i.e. any concept (Begriff), being capable of being adequate to it; it 
consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by 
language.4 
 
Kant himself indirectly connects the symbolic hypotyposis with the aesthetic idea in 
finding that both operate by analogy and are irreducible to a single concept. Schiller 
begins using ‘symbol’ in the sense of Kant’s ‘aesthetic idea’ by 1794, and Goethe quickly 
adopts the term, as do the early romantics.5 The symbol thus defined is generative, and 
over time the generative activity is inflated to the point that symbols become finite 
representations of the infinite.6 The romantic symbol is thus naturally drawn into the 
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orbit of religious symbolism, so that it provides direct mediation between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal: the bread and wine of the eucharist are the body and blood of Christ, 
while retaining their fallen status as bread and wine;7 Christ himself is God incarnate; 
body and soul are united in the human being. 
 It is important to note that there are virtually as many definitions of symbol as 
there are romantic theorists, and the meaning of its effete doppelgänger, allegory, is just 
as variable.8 Still, important and even pervasive patterns of meaning can be observed. 
Perhaps the most important idea is that symbols only refer to themselves: Zeus is the 
ruler of the cosmos and awesome cosmic phenomena; one does not represent the other. 
Indeed, Zeus is both the cosmic ruler and everything else he is said to have been. Late 
Schelling adopted Coleridge’s ‘tautegorical’ to denote this feature of the symbol.9 
Todorov’s term for the same feature is ‘intransitive’; which allows him to distinguish the 
symbol from ‘transitive’ allegory more crisply than the romantics themselves were able 
to do.10 
 Three figures standing on the temporal or spiritual periphery of romanticism 
provide important inspiration for its early conception of myth: the philologist, Christian 
Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812)—whose Göttingen lectures both Schlegels attended—
Heyne’s younger friend, the cleric Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)—in residence at 
Weimar since 1776—and Germany’s greatest playwright, Johann Christoph Friedrich 
von Schiller (1759-1805)—whose dramatic activities at Weimar led to his falling out 
with Herder.11 Heyne, the founder of Classical Studies, is also a founder of the modern 
scientific study of myth, and of comparative mythology and ethnology. He coined the 
word mythus in 1763-1764 by Latinizing the Greek word muthos—Heyne wrote in 
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Latin—in order to describe a body of material that formerly went by the name of fabula, 
German Fabel.12 The new name implied a new understanding of the material as an object 
of serious study. The reason it needed rescuing was twofold: of primary importance was 
the general discrediting of allegorical interpretations of myth, and with them of myth 
itself.13 
 It should be noted at the outset that allegory is already a feature of Homeric epic, 
most strikingly in Phoinix’s story of how Prayers are daughters of Zeus who follow after 
Ate seeking to heal the ruin she causes (Il. 9.502-12), and Akhilleus’ account of the two 
wine jars that lie stored on the threshold of Zeus, consisting of both evils and good things 
(Il. 24.527-33).14 Allegorical interpretations of Homer begin as early as Theagenes of 
Rhegium (fl. ca. 525 B.C.), though they proceed along other lines than Homer’s actual 
usage.15 Theagenes himself seems to have explained the Theomachy in Iliad 20 as 
referring to strife between the elements; he goes on to say that the gods can similarly 
personify qualities such as folly (Ares) or wisdom (Athene).16 In other words, Theagenes 
seems to have employed both physical and moral allegory in defense of Homer against 
the objections of moral philosophers such as Xenophanes (fl. ca. 540 B.C.). In time, 
physical allegory would be taken up by Stoic, and moral by Neoplatonic philosophy. A 
third type of allegorical reading, euhemerism, together with moral allegory would remain 
popular throughout the middle ages and into the renaissance, especially among Christian 
authors. The reason for its popularity is simple: myth was the common stock of ancient 
art and to do away with it was unthinkable, yet it offended against reason and moral 
decency and a way had to be found to render it unobjectionable. 
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 The reasons that allegory becomes discredited by the 18th century are also not 
hard to find. First is the potentially subjective and arbitrary nature of allegorical 
hermeneutics, and the implausible and conflicting interpretations to which they therefore 
often led, such as the aforementioned allegoresis of the Götterkampf by Theagenes. More 
important is that allegory was increasingly seen as developmentally implausible: those 
nurtured on a degeneration model of human history, embodied in the Judeo-Christian 
myth of the fall, might find it easy to believe in “the wisdom of the ancients;”17 but those 
who adopted the enlightenment model of progressive history would not be so inclined. (It 
is important to note that both models of history, specifically that of generational decline 
and of cultural progress, can easily coexist in society without the contradiction being 
apparent: they do so already in Homer, as also in the contemporary US.) A decisive 
factor in this regard was the comparatively recent discovery of ‘myths’ among other 
preliterate small-societies in Africa and the Americas, and their sometimes astonishing 
similarity to the classic Greek myths. Thus bereft of their hidden meanings, myth was 
increasingly seen to be illogical, absurd, and worst of all, immoral. Emblematic is 
Fontenelle’s oft quoted declaration: “Let us not seek for anything in the Fables except the 
story of the errors of the human mind.”18 
 Into this breach steps Heyne, a professor at Göttingen from 1763 until his death in 
1812. Heyne advocated an interdisciplinary approach to the study of classical antiquity; 
myth was a key component of that approach, essential for understanding ancient art and 
literature.19 Based in part on his own research into contemporary ‘primitives’ in Africa 
and the Americas, Heyne concluded that mythology is a universal feature of human 
culture: if a culture does not now have a mythology, then it has simply lost it. Moreover, 
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myth is not merely a function of narrative content, but a type of speech and of 
consciousness; and it is not abstract or rational but highly concrete and emotional. 
Heyne’s term for this language is sermo mythicus, the necessary and universal form of 
speech among the first men, prisci homines, who lived during the childhood of the race, 
in the aetas mythica. Every form of expression, including religion, is ultimately 
subordinate to its rules. Specifically, myth is the imaginative product of linguistic 
impoverishment, a verbal response to astonishing and frightening natural phenomena, 
often in the form of naming and personifying so as to make knowable (this can be 
paralleled in Vico though there is no evidence Heyne read him; echoes can also be found 
in Heyne’s contemporary Blake, and will later be taken up by Blumenberg). The sermo 
mythicus thus produces the first philosophy of man, in the form of cosmogonies and 
theogonies. (Heyne would have found much to support his view of the mythological 
origins of philosophy in the Presocratics.) A second, and secondary, species of myth is 
inspired by memorable events, including heroic achievements. Early myth is thus a 
species of philosophical or historical narrative, but not as the allegorists and euhemerists 
understood it. Most important, Greek mythology is the anonymous product of Greek 
prehistory: contrary to popular belief of the day, Homer did not create the myths he 
relates; rather he adopts them primarily for purposes of drama and entertainment. Early 
philosophical and historical myth thus combine to produce a third and historically later 
species of myth, the poetic. Heyne is thereby able to reconcile the irrationalism of myth 
with the rationalism of the epics in which they are embedded by locating their origins at 
different stages in Greek history. As found in the epics, Greek myth is thus the product of 
centuries of evolution, in tandem with the evolution of Greek culture and literature. 
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Restoring the myths to their original form is, moreover, an arduous process, and once 
restored they can only be evaluated in relation to the historical conditions that produced 
them; in other words, they should be understood and assessed on their own terms and not 
with the values and standards of the present day. Nevertheless, Heyne, based on his 
extensive reading of ethnographic literature, came to be convinced that human nature is 
everywhere essentially the same, and that this is reflected in world myth, although the 
mythology of different peoples is also conditioned by environmental and historical 
factors. Contemporary primitive societies can thus be used to elucidate early Greece and 
its literature. (Again a parallel can be drawn to Fontenelle and to Vico.) 
 Herder shared Heyne’s views on myth and did much to promote them.20 As a 
consequence it is often impossible to determine the source of individual ideas, and what 
primarily distinguishes them can be attributed to their professional callings: the 
philologist Heyne sought to understand myth in semantic and philosophical terms, while 
the cleric Herder saw myth in terms of religious expressivity. It is worth observing in this 
context that the outlines of Heyne’s thinking were already in place in his 1764 
publication; and his friendship with Herder begins with the latter’s visit to Göttingen in 
February 1772.21 
 Herder’s own acceptance of national myth is linked to several defining features of 
his thought, including most notably his ‘organic nationalism.’22 A second related reason 
is that, together with Vico, Herder is the recognized founder of historicism (although as 
we have seen Heyne also historicizes).23 His historicism, in turn, leads Herder to reject 
enlightenment belief that universal laws could be applied to the study of human cultures 
and cultural products; he felt that, on the contrary, one could not do so without gross 
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oversimplification and impoverishment, that is to say without stripping the culture so 
understood of all that makes it unique and interesting. Moreover, the value of all cultures 
is equal, and different cultures must be evaluated on their own terms: ancient Greece 
should not be judged by modern German standards and values, or vice versa. Culture and 
its products should therefore be understood from the inside: one must, so far as is 
possible, immerse oneself in the mindset and experience of the ancient Greeks in order to 
understand their myths and poetry. So literature must be historicized as well, and 
enlightenment attempts to apply universal standards to its study are likewise misguided. 
 Again like Heyne, Herder engages in comparative analysis of the ancients with 
other ‘primitives,’ though unlike the philologist, he turns not to the Americas or Africa 
but to the contemporary peasants of northern Germany. (Vico likewise studied the 
peasant farmers of Campania.) He departs from Heyne more fundamentally, however, in 
finding that religious sentiment is the fons et origo of myth; whereas Heyne thought that 
myth was developmentally earlier than poetry, Herder equated myth with religious 
poetry. This, rather than Heyne’s historically more plausible account of myth’s origins, 
will find an echo in romantic theories. And it leads to a more positive valuation of myth 
than we find in Heyne, who recognizes, even celebrates its value for understanding the 
ancient world and its artifacts, but who still feels the need to account for its scandalous 
and ‘primitive’ content. In an echo of Vico that may be deliberate, Herder finds that the 
very primitiveness of ancient man made them great poets: living in a state of nature, they 
sang about their lived experiences; while modern poets compose their works on paper 
locked away in their studies. Modern poetry is consequently more refined, but has lost the 
power and immediacy of the ancient songs. (This historical contrast directly foreshadows 
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Schiller.) Thus, in contrast to enlightenment thought with its Whiggish view of historical 
progress, Herder favorably contrasts the free and vital savages of the first age with the 
effete and inconsequential men of the present. Finally, Herder finds that people are 
unified by common traditions and language, while language gives expression to their 
collective experience. 
 The importance of the individual’s oneness with the community is central to 
Herder; from this it follows that a poem can be the product of a single person while still 
giving voice to the entire culture, which becomes an individual in its own right. Sadly, he 
finds, this is not so today. And it leads to a call to arms: “As early poetry was magical, a 
spur to ‘heroes, hunters, lovers’, men of action, a continuation of experience, so, mutatis 
mutandis, it must be so now also.”24 Whereas Schiller sees irredeemable loss, Herder 
directly anticipates Friedrich Schlegel’s optimistic appeal to invent a new mythology (see 
below). He was also himself an avid collector of traditional stories, publishing a 
collection of folk-songs in 1773 that would prove inspirational to the Heidelberger 
romantics, von Arnim and Brentano, and to the brothers Grimm. 
 Comparative mythology and ethnology, historicism, the universality of myth in 
small-scale, preindustrial societies, an age of myth, myth as primitive thought, as 
childlike thought, a mythic consciousness even, the necessary and universal mode of 
thought by early man, nature myth, myth as the origin of philosophy and science—these 
are the enduring legacies of Heyne and Herder on romantic and subsequent theorization 
of myth. 
 If Heyne and Herder stand at the temporal periphery of romanticism, then Schiller 
stands at its spiritual and physical periphery. Nevertheless, he was a professor of history 
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at Jena from 1789 to 1799; and the Schlegels and Schelling were frequent and welcome 
visitors to Weimar, about twenty kilometers distant. Schiller had already published the 
elegiac Die Götter Griechenlands a year before his arrival in Jena, and would go on to 
publish a condensed version in 1800. During his time at Jena, in 1795-6, Schiller 
published Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung in three installments in the journal 
Die Horen, of which he was editor. Although more closely identified with Weimar 
classicism, Schiller was thus intimately acquainted with the Jena romantics and his elegy 
remains one of the most eloquent early articulations of early romantic nostalgia for lost 
unity in the face of modern alienation.25 At the same time, it echoes many of the beliefs 
and attitudes of Heyne and Herder—and before them Vico and Fontenelle—towards 
ancient myth. 
 In Die Götter Griechenlands, Schiller recasts the temporal antinomy found in 
Herder as the loss of natural religion, to which he responds with grief.26 Whereas ancient 
man experienced the magic and wonder of an animate natural world, the rise of 
Christianity and scientific rationalism at the expense of pagan religion has left us with an 
entgöttete Natur: 
 
Where now, as our wise men say, 
a soulless fireball spins, 
long ago Helios, in quiet majesty, 
drove his golden car,    20 
Oread nymphs filled these heights, 
a Dryad died with every tree,27 
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from the urns of lovely Naiads 
sprang the silver-foaming streams. 
 
* * * 
 
So as to enrich but one among you   155 
the world of gods must pass away: 
mournful, Selene I seek in the starry dome, 
but find you there no more. 
Through the forest, through the waves I call 
Ah, their echoes are but empty!    160 
Unconscious of the joy that she bestows, 
never charmed by her own splendor, 
never ware of the hand that guides her, 
through my own thanks never richer, 
without feeling even for her artist’s honors  165 
like the dead clang of clock-pendula 
like a slave, she serves gravitation’s laws, 
does Nature, now bereft of God.  
 
Nature has lost her divinities, her consciousness, and nothing compensates us for the loss. 
Seven years later, in Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, the modern artist 
receives some measure of aesthetic compensation. In that essay, Schiller recast his earlier 
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antinomy as the naive poetry of classical antiquity and the sentimental poetry of 
modernity: “The poet (Dichter), I say, is either Nature, or else he will seek her. The 
former makes for the naive, the latter the sentimental, poet” (716; cf. 712). The naive 
poet is characterized by a spontaneous originality, in contrast to the philosophically 
informed self-consciousness of the sentimental poet, in whom Schiller obviously sees 
himself. (He shrewdly identifies Horace as the first sentimental poet [712]: Horace is 
arguably the most refined poet of antiquity, and often expresses love for his Sabine farm 
which he claims to prefer to urban life in Rome, but his poetry is not characterized by 
emotional power.) As in Die Götter Griechenlands, the key to the contrast remains man’s 
relationship with nature. Schiller closes the gap between subject and object by locating 
nature in the naive poet as he lived in and experienced it. Just as the distance between 
subject and object is closed in the person of the poet, so too is the gap between signifier 
and signified in his language, in marked contrast to the language of modern poetry: 
 
If [in the case of modern poetry], the sign remains eternally heterogeneous and 
alien to the signified, so springs forth [in the case of ancient poetry] the language 
as through an inner necessity from the thought, and is so one with it that the spirit 
(Geist) appears as though laid bare, even beneath its bodily husk. Such an art of 
expression, where the sign disappears entirely in the signified, and where the 
language leaves the thought which it expresses simultaneously naked, since it 
could not express it in any other way without at the same time veiling it 
(verhüllen) is that which one, in the art of writing best calls brilliant and profound 
(genialish und geistreich). 
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 (706) 
 
It is important to note that Schiller has a clear grasp of the phenomenon he is describing 
before he has a word for it. (Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung appears one year 
after his first use of the word symbol, but it does not occur in the essay.) Compare the 
following passage from Die Götter Griechenlands: 
 
In ancient times the pictorial veil of poetry 
still wrapped itself lovingly round Truth—   10 
through the creation flowed life’s fullness 
and what will never feel, then felt. 
 
Because of their very oneness with nature, however, the ancients took nature for granted, 
a fact one finds reflected in their poetry. On the other hand, the separation of man and 
nature defines the modern condition, producing a nostalgic appreciation of nature. It is 
thus precisely because nature has disappeared from our beings that we can appreciate it 
outside ourselves: “They (i.e. the ancients) felt naturally; we feel the natural. . . .Our 
feeling for nature is like the feeling of a sick man for health” (711). Finally, only the 
naive poet is a true genius; and he also has a childlike simplicity of character and 
expression (704-6). Unfamiliar with the rules, and guided solely by nature and instinct, 
the genius solves every problem with ease; his intuitions (Einfälle) are divine gifts, his 
feelings (Gefühle) are laws for the poets of later ages: 
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It is only granted to the genius, when he is outside the familiar to always feel at 
home, and to expand nature without going beyond her. . . .The genius must 
resolve the most complicated tasks with modest simplicity and ease; the egg of 
Columbus holds true for every verdict of genius. 
 (704) 
 
The naive genius does not go beyond nature because he remains part of nature. 
 Although Schiller’s discussion is devoted to the difference between ancient and 
modern poetry, it should already be apparent that it bears a striking resemblance to 
romantic theories of myth and symbol, and to the crises they were meant to address. In 
this regard, two points should be kept in mind: Heyne excepted, contemporary critics 
routinely identified the ancient poets, and Homer chief among them, as the creators of the 
myths they relate; and romantic theorists in particular tend to conflate myth and poetry, in 
particular Homeric epic. Whereas Schiller’s overall assessment in both the poem and the 
essay is pessimistic—what is lost is lost, though we may be partially compensated by 
heightened aesthetic appreciation—the early romantics believed it was possible to restore 
the lost unities through the healing power of myth, of whom none was more optimistic in 
this regard than Friedrich Schlegel. 
 If anyone could be said to personify the Frühromantik it is the younger Schlegel.28 
His Gespräch über die Poesie includes a section entitled Rede über die Mythologie that 
will be the focus of our discussion. Schlegel began work on the Gespräch in Berlin in the 
spring of 1799, and would return to Jena in the fall to complete and then publish it in 
volume three of the Athenäum (1800), a journal he edited with his brother, August 
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Wilhelm. In that same year, Schelling published System des transscendentalen Idealismus 
and Wordsworth added the famous preface to the second edition of his Lyrical Ballads. 
In volume one of the same journal (1798) there appeared a collection of notionally 
anonymous literary fragments, among which Schlegel’s Fragment 116 is generally 
acknowledged as the manifesto of the romantic movement: the Gespräch in turn has been 
called an extended commentary on the fragment;29 and at its very core lies a discussion 
of myth.  
 Although the Rede will be our focus, it is essential to place that section in the 
wider context of the Gespräch, which is formally modeled on Plato’s Symposium. The 
setting reflects Schlegel’s advocacy of collective enterprises, reinforced by his belief that 
myth is a collective expression that remains the product of countless individuals; and he 
did much to promote cooperative ventures among members of the Jena circle. 
Emblematic of this are the collections of fragments he published in volume one of the 
Athenäum and the same volume in which the Gespräch appears (the Ideen). Numerous 
members of the circle thus contributed to the collections, but they remained largely 
anonymous, just as the ‘authors’ of myth were anonymous. 
 In the Gespräch, Schlegel follows Herder’s historicism, in an effort to develop a 
history that is also a theory of literature. And as in Herder, his historicism is incompatible 
with neo-classical theories of rigid literary genres, but instead treats genre as changing 
through time, so that any attempt to deploy the same interpretive models on say Homer, 
Vergil, Dante, and Milton will be hopelessly reductive. As it relates to myth, Schlegel’s 
historicism means that Greek or Norse myth on their own are unable to supply the 
modern need for a canonical frame of reference. Nevertheless, the romantic yearning for 
 18 
unity and the reverence in which Greek culture was held in the wake of Winckelmann 
meant that Greek myth remained a ‘necessary’ and even central part of the new 
mythology Schlegel envisions. Schlegel’s solution is thus radically assimilationist: a new 
mythology will incorporate all earlier mythology into itself, as well as history, philosophy 
and science. 
 Ludovico, who delivers the speech on mythology, has been seen as a pseudonym 
of Friedrich Schelling. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe identify him confidently—and go on 
to identify the other discussants as well—and they are followed in this by Adams and von 
Hendy, while Behler and Struc are more circumspect.30 It is certainly the case that 
“Ludovico” shares the optimism one finds in Schelling as to the modern capacity to 
create myth, and the eventual return of all the arts and sciences to it; also like Schelling, 
Ludovico treats myth as virtually identical to poetry. Weighing against simple 
identification, however, is a conceptual absence: although Ludovico uses the term 
‘symbol,’ he does so interchangeably with allegory in the manner of Winckelmann; while 
Schelling has already begun to theorize the symbol in terms of Kant’s aesthetic idea (see 
below). Moreover, the Gespräch’s closeness to the Athenäum Fragment, and lack of a 
rebuttal of Ludovico’s contribution on myth, which closely coheres with the overall 
program of the Gespräch and its close relationship to the Athenäum Fragment, suggests 
that there is nothing in the speech that the Schlegels would not themselves endorse; and 
though Schelling was on cordial terms with August, relations with Friedrich were 
strained, and remained so throughout their lifetimes. 
 The Gespräch begins with an anonymous narrator eulogizing poetry, and 
declaring the need for the poet to be true to his own nature, and not to let a leveling 
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criticism—compare Herder on enlightenment criticism—rob him of that. The worlds of 
poetry and nature are both infinite and inexhaustible. Indeed, poetry itself includes all 
living nature, all that is ‘created.’ And we are able to understand the poetry of man and 
nature because we share in the poet’s creative spirit. We must strive to perfect and to 
expand the range of our poetry, and to integrate our individual voices into the larger 
whole. This is accomplished by learning to view poetry from a variety of perspectives. 
The Gespräch is thus itself an example of this process. 
 There follows a mise en scène: Amalia and Camilla are discussing a play when 
Marcus and Antonio arrive. We learn that such get-togethers are common and that the 
topic is usually poetry. Amalia, however, realizes that they often talk at cross-purposes 
because they do not understand one another’s views. Various members of the circle agree 
to give speeches explaining their thoughts about poetry. Andrea gives the first speech, on 
the Epochen der Dichtkunst. 
 His opening gambit is to equate the science of poetry with its history: “The art [of 
poetry] rests on knowledge (Wissen), and the science (Wissenschaft) of art is its history” 
(290). At the beginning of this history is Homer, whose epics are a beautifully 
constructed (291: reizend gebildete) and peaceful chaos (292: ruhige Chaos). The epic 
genre soon declined and was replaced by iambic and elegy, which is the very opposite of 
“mythic poetry,” that is, epic (291). Together with epic, they formed the fonts of all 
Hellenic poetry. Among the tragedians, Aeschylus is the prototype for severe greatness 
(Urbild der harten Größe) and unschooled enthusiasm, and Sophocles of harmonic 
perfection, while Euripides betrays the unfathomable softness of the decadent (293). 
Greek poetry so conceived is poetry itself; all that follows is at best a return to its 
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Olympian peaks. Turning briefly to the Romans, Andrea notes that erotic and didactic 
poetry predominates, and in a further echo of Herder declares that “the man of 
understanding leaves every creation (Gebildete) in its own sphere, and judges it only 
according to its own ideal” (295). 
 After a thousand year hiatus, Dante emerged as the father of modern poetry by 
binding it to religion. Although Greek literature was unavailable to him, the Romans 
were able to inspire in Dante the general conception of a monumental work with an 
elaborated architecture (von geordnetem Gliederbau, 297). Together with Dante, Petrarch 
and Boccaccio form the three leaders of early modern art: Petrarch perfected the canzone 
and sonnet; Boccaccio bequeathed to us an inexhaustible series of stories. Of those who 
followed, Ariosto is singled out for his advances in narrative art of the emerging genre of 
the romance; romance, however, never succeeded in establishing itself as the peer of epic. 
 Andrea groups the Spaniards and English together on the strength of their greatest 
authors, Cervantes and Shakespeare, who eclipse all others (299). Shakespeare breathed 
the romantic spirit into all of his dramas so that they constitute a foundation of modern 
drama that will endure. After these two died, so did poetry in their countries; yet 
philosophy rose to take their place. In France, nothing worthy of the name of poet has 
emerged. In Germany, Goethe is identified as a universal genius; part of his success is 
that he has traced the history of poetry back to its source, so that the poetry of all ages is 
reflected in his work. Another important current trend in Germany is that philosophy and 
poetry work together to their mutual stimulation and development (303). 
 There follows an intermezzo in which the symposiasts exchange witticisms. 
Lothario concludes that every art and science that achieves its effect through language is 
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poetry if it is practiced for its own sake and reaches the peak of perfection (304). Marcus 
wishes for a theory of poetic genres which is a system of a classification and 
simultaneously a history and theory of poetic art (305). They conclude by posing without 
answering the question, Whether poetry can be taught and learned, and whether poetic 
schools, such as existed in ancient times, are still feasible. 
 Ludovico now presents his Rede über die Mythologie, which we will consider in 
detail below. His talk is followed by as second intermezzo, in which, Lothario takes 
Ludovico’s expansion of poetry to include all great and disinterested literature, myth, 
philosophy and even physics a step further by declaring that all the arts and sciences 
developed out of myth, and will “flow back” into it (324). He thus anticipates a core 
tenant of Schelling’s theory of myth. To Andrea’s praise that Dante had single-handedly 
managed to fashion a kind of mythology, Lothario replies with a definition of the artwork 
that closely mirrors the later, romantic understanding of myth and that again conflates 
myth and art: “Only insofar as it is ‘one and all’ (Eins und Alles), does a work become a 
work” (327). At this point, Antonio steps forward to read his Brief über den Roman, 
originally composed for Amalia. 
 Antonio maintains that “colorful potpourris of sickly wit are the only romantic 
products of our unromantic age” (330), endorsing the work of Friedrich Richter and 
dismissing that of Fielding and Fontaine as “ignoble rubbish.” Although praising the wit 
of Sterne, Diderot and Swift, he denies that they are among the truly greats, owing to the 
“sickly conditions” of the present (331). Richter is thus greater than Sterne because he is 
more sickly, and we should cultivate our sense of the grotesque as a defense against the 
sheer stupidity of much modern literature. The romantic itself is defined as “that which 
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depicts sentimental material in fantastic form” (333).31 True sentimentality is spiritual 
rather than sensual, and its source is love, which must “everywhere hover invisibly 
visible” in romantic poetry (333-4). It allows itself to be veiled in mortal beauty; but the 
particulars to which it clings “only hint at the higher, infinite hieroglyph of the one 
eternal Love and the sacred fullness of life of creating and fashioning Nature” (334). 
Whereas ancient poetry remains anchored in mythology at all times, and even avoids 
truly historical material, romantic poetry by contrast remains entirely grounded in history, 
even more than is generally recognized (334). Moreover, ‘romantic’ and ‘modern’ are not 
the same thing: Lessing, for example, is modern but hardly romantic, while Shakespeare 
is the very heart of romantic fantasy. Romanticism is thus not so much a genre or 
historical moment as an element of poetry that may be more or less present at any time. 
 After the briefest of intermezzos on women’s attitudes towards men and the arts, 
Marcus announces that he will offer some remarks about Goethe entitled Versuch über 
den verschiedenen Styl in Goethes früheren und späteren Werken. In this essay, we have 
a history of an individual that is implicitly analogous to the history of an entire epoch or 
genre. There is thus virtually no other author in whom the differences between the early 
and late works are so striking. The difference does not simply consist of his views and 
beliefs, but also his manner of depiction and the forms employed (341). Marcus chooses 
three works, Goetz von Berlichingen, Tasso and Hermann und Dorothea to represent 
Goethe’s early, middle, and late periods. The central claim of the essay is that in Goethe’s 
first period, subjective and objective are completely mixed; in the second period, the 
exposition is completely objective, although what is actually interesting about works of 
the period is that the spirit (Geist) of harmony and reflection betray its connection with a 
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certain individuality; in the third period subjective and objective are purely separate, and 
Hermann und Dorothea is completely objective (345). In general, only Shakespeare and 
Cervantes are Goethe’s peers in universal genius. Marcus also affirms the earlier claim 
that Goethe’s art is the first “which embraces all the poetry of the ancients and moderns 
together, and contains the seed of eternal progress” (347). After his talk concludes, the 
symposiasts talk briefly about the possibility, extent and nature of a union between 
ancient and modern poetry. Ludovico argues that the spirit of poetry is everywhere the 
same and the union should be complete. Lothario notes, however, that the spirit may be 
the same, but that the outward form may differ, in matters such as meter. Ludovico 
asserts that language, “as it was originally conceived, is identical with allegory” (348). 
Lothario concludes that “first when the mysteries and mythology have been rejuvenated 
by the spirit of physics will it be possible to create tragedies in which everything is 
ancient but will still be able to grasp through its meaning the spirit of the age” (350). 
 This then is the context in which Ludovico presents his talk on mythology. He 
begins by lamenting that modern poets lack a fixed basis (festen Halt) for their poetry, a 
nurturing soil (mütterlichen Boden), a heaven, a living air (312). Instead, each poet must 
create all this for himself from within and with each new work. The ancients had such a 
basis in mythology, and modern poetry is inferior to ancient precisely because its poets 
do not: 
 
My position is that our poetry lacks a common focus and frame of reference 
(Mittelpunkt), such as mythology was for the ancients, and the fundamental 
reason (alles Wesentliche) why our poetry is inferior to antique can be summed 
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up in the words: we have no mythology. 
 (312)  
 
In other words, the Greeks were culturally unified by a body of shared narratives, and 
therefore produced superior art, as they supplied a common stock of material and frame 
of reference and belief on which to draw in the production and reception of art. If he had 
replaced ‘myth’ with ‘natural religion’ his position would have seemed much like 
Schiller’s. But whereas for Schiller the loss is permanent, Ludovico hastens to add that 
the solution to the modern dilemma is to work earnestly together to create a new one. The 
historicist position is confirmed that the old mythology cannot simply be revived and 
adopted; but, like the old, the new mythology will be a collaborative enterprise, in 
marked contrast to the modern poet, working in isolation to create the world anew with 
every poem. 
 Moreover, the new mythology will come to us by an entirely different way than 
the old did. In ancient times, myth was the first flowering of youthful fantasy, which 
without mediation (unmittelbar) attaches itself to and reproduces (anbildend) what was 
most immediate (das Nächste) and alive in the sensuous world (312). Thus far, Schlegel 
reproduces a contemporary commonplace on the origin and subject matter of myth, 
though what follows is anything but: the new mythology must be developed 
(herausgebildet) from out of the deepest depths of the spirit (des Geistes). It must envelop 
(umfassen) all other works of art, and serve as the bed and vessel for the ancient and 
eternal fountain-head of poetry, and even as the infinite poem which covers the seeds of 
all other poems (312). 
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 At this point, Ludovico addresses the issue of why he is giving a talk on 
mythology in a dialogue about poetry that is implicitly a romantic manifesto: myth and 
poetry are one and indivisible. They are a chaos that is also the highest beauty, indeed the 
highest order. The poems of antiquity join to each other until a whole constitutes itself, in 
which everything interpenetrates each other and—in a further echo of the claim that 
ancient myth is both a chaos and the highest form of order—everywhere there is one and 
the same spirit, differently expressed. In short: “Ancient poetry is a single, indivisible, 
‘complete and perfect’ (vollendetes) poem” (313). Modern mythology will come about in 
a different way, but there is no reason it cannot be even more beautiful or great. And, in a 
move that would especially appeal to the pantheists, he declares that it will even 
incorporate physics (315; for Lothario’s response, see above). 
 As noted above, what is conspicuously absent from the discussion is the role of 
symbolism, even in passages that would seem to cry out for it, such as the following: 
“and what is any beautiful mythology other than a hieroglyphic expression of the 
surrounding nature in this transfiguration of imagination (Verklärung von Fantasie) and 
love?” (318). Noting that Schlegel uses symbol and allegory interchangeably in the 
Gespräch, Dieckmann in fact argues that Schlegel only comes to fully appreciate the 
meaning and usefulness of the ‘romantic’ symbol when Schelling lectures on mythology 
at Jena two years later.32 This bears on how we interpret one passage in which Schlegel 
does mention symbolism: 
For that is the beginning of all poetry, namely abolishing the standard processes 
(Gang) and laws of a rationally (vernünftig) thinking reason (Vernunft), and 
transporting us back into the beautiful confusion of the imagination (Fantasie) and 
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the original chaos of human nature, for which I thus far know of no more 
beautiful symbol than the colorful pageant (bunte Gewimmel) of the ancient gods. 
 (319) 
 
Symbol here does not represent the infinite in finite form, but rather accidental allegory. 
Where Schlegel in fact comes closest to a symbolic understanding of myth is in 
Ludovico’s appeal to Spinoza and a mystical understanding of nature with which the talk 
closes.33 As we shall see, this too can be paralleled in Schelling, though it is worth noting 
that Schelling nowhere mentions Spinoza in Die Philosophie der Kunst (PdK), and only 
once in passing in Das System des transcendentalen Idealismus (StI).34 
 For a representative early romantic theory of the ‘secular’ symbol, we now turn to 
Schelling’s Die Philosophie der Kunst.35 That Schelling should be singled out needs 
little defense: in the work of no other romantic philosopher has mythology played such an 
important role, and PdK is his most important theoretical intervention on the topic during 
this period. Admittedly, PdK was published posthumously, in 1859, and was not 
translated into English until 1989, and its direct influence on romantic thought is not 
obvious. Nevertheless, Schelling delivered the lectures on which the essay is based at 
Jena in 1802-3, and again at Würzburg in 1804-5, and they were widely circulated in 
manuscript form: it is estimated that 130 students attended his lectures in Jena alone, 
among them Henry Crabb Robinson, who instructed Madame de Staël on Schelling both 
in person and with four essays that subsequently made their way to her ancestral estate on 
Lake Geneva, where they remain to this day.36 Staël went on to publish the hugely 
influential D’Allemagne in 1810-13, including a 172 page section on contemporary 
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German philosophy, with a brief, sustained discussion of Schelling and numerous further 
references scattered throughout the text. Friedrich Schlegel, who was not in Jena when 
Schelling delivered his lectures, likely became acquainted with them in this way, and it 
helped lead to systematic revision of Gespräch to include references to symbolism, 
including the subtitle to the section on myth which now reads: “Rede über die 
Mythologie und symbolische Anschauung.”37 He also much influenced Coleridge, who 
became the mostly anonymous gateway of his ideas to Anglophone readers;38 and he 
found a new champion at the turn of the last century in Ernst Cassirer, who was highly 
influential among contemporary theorists of myth and literature.39 
Schelling shares with Schlegel a number of assumptions that are typical of early 
romanticism, including the need for a return to myth and optimism over our ability to do 
so. He also makes some rather grandiose claims for myth, and in particular Greek myth 
that outbid Schlegel himself. For example, he finds that myth is “the necessary condition 
(Bedingung) and first content (der erste Stoff) of all art” (45 [405]), and “the highest 
archetype (Urbild) of the poetic world” (36 [392]).40 Echoing Schlegel’s assertion that 
art needs mythology to attain the greatness achieved by the ancients, Schelling declares 
that myth is not simply the first, but the “universal content” (allgemeine Stoff) of art (45 
[406]), and even the universe itself: 
 
Mythology is nothing other than the universe (das Universum) in its higher 
manifestation (Gewand), in its absolute form (Gestalt), the true universe in itself, 
image or symbol of life and of wondrous chaos in the divine imagination, itself 
already poesy and yet in and for itself the content and element of poesy. It 
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(mythology) is the world and as it were (gleichsam) the ground in which alone the 
exotic plants of art are able to bloom and grow. Only within such a world are 
abiding and definite forms (Gestalten) possible through which alone the eternal 
concepts (Begriffe) can be expressed. 
 (45 [405-6]) 
 
Its objectives and even its scope are the same as those of philosophy: “all possibilities 
within the realm of ideas (Ideenreich) as constructed by philosophy are completely 
exhausted (erschöpft) in Greek mythology” (41 [400]). More than this, myth offers a 
solution to the horrors of modernity; and the secret to this awesome power is the concept 
missing from Schlegel’s dialogue, namely the symbol. 
Schelling’s litany of modern horrors are shared by his fellow romantics. The 
present age is at war against the sublime, great, ideal and beautiful, and instead worships 
the frivolous, “sensually pleasing” (Sinnenreizende) and a “vile sort of nobility” (auf 
niederträchtige Art Edele) (11 [361]: my translation). It is an age “of small-minded 
attitudes and a crippling of sense” (Kleinichkeit der Gesinnungen und Verkrüplung des 
Sinns) (87 [464]: my translation). Whereas in the springtime of an age there is a cultural 
unity and living spirit shared by its artists, this is gradually lost, resulting in 
fragmentation (10-11 [359-61]), so that “the modern world is one of individuals and of 
degeneration or collapse (Zerfallens)” (73 [444]). Enlightenment thinkers are “imbeciles” 
(blödsinnige) (67 [435]), who have never been able to produce poetry of any value, and 
such poetry as they did produce is utterly lacking in symbolism; if you brought them all 
to together and gave them a hundred years, all they would come up with is Sandcastles 
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(71 [441]).41 Kantians in particular are distinguished by their “extreme tastelessness” 
(äußerste Geschmacklosigkeit), and a philosophy that is “devoid of spirit” 
(Geistlosigkeit) (12 [362]). Unsurprisingly, art and nature are the twin remedies to 
mankind’s plight, these being analogous ‘creations’: 
 
I doubt one could find a more appropriate means of cleansing (reinigen) oneself 
from such pettiness than acquaintance (Verkehr) with the greatness of nature (mit 
der großen Natur). I doubt also that there is a richer source of great thoughts and 
of heroic resolve than the ever renewed pleasure in the vision (Anschauung) of 
that which is concretely and physically (sinnlich) terrible and great. 
 (87 [464]) 
 
What is perhaps surprising is Schelling’s further claim that art is potentially a more 
potent remedy than nature herself. For a work of art can and indeed must attain “an even 
higher reality” than nature (45 [406]): as a consequence it is able to convey an intuition of 
that reality more effectively than nature herself is able to do. 
 Before we turn to the cure, it is necessary to provide some context. Schelling’s 
pantheism allows him to dissolve the Kantian divide between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal by locating God within and throughout nature. Humans are able to intuit the 
divine infinite in the particulars of nature because of the divine element within our own 
being. Schelling’s word for this element is Genius, and those who possess enough of it 
are able to intuit the union of the infinite and the particular in the particular artwork. 
Genius is “the indwelling element of divinity in human beings” (84 [460]); it is “a piece 
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of the absoluteness of God” (ibid), and as such is able to “pour itself” (ergießt sich) into 
the particular it creates (85 [461]). As a consequence, “Each artist can thus produce only 
as much as is united or allied (verbunden) with the eternal concept (Begriff) of his own 
essence (Wesens) in God” (84 [460]).  
Schelling’s metaphysics treats all art, science and culture as emanating from and 
objectifying this divine absolute. God’s creations are his ideas or archetypes, which are 
imperfectly embodied in the reflected world. God’s work as the supreme creator is thus 
thoroughly analogous to that of the creative artist: “The divine creation is represented 
objectively (objectiv) through art, for that creation is based on the same informing 
(Einbildung) of infinite ideality into the real upon which art is also based” (31-2 [386]). 
The idea of God is the idea of absolute, infinite reality (23 [373]); thus, “In the intuition 
(Anschauung) of every idea, for example, the idea of the circle, we are also intuiting 
eternity” (25 [375]). Given objective form, the ideas are gods: thus, “What ideas are for 
philosophy, the gods are for art, and vice versa” (35 [391]). Apparent differences are a 
matter of perspective only: 
 
These same syntheses (Ineinsbildungen) of the universal and the particular that 
viewed in themselves are ideas, that is, images of the divine, are, if viewed on the 
plane of the real, the gods, for their essence (Wesen), their essential nature (das 
An-sich von ihnen), = god. They are ideas only to the extent that they are god in a 
particular form. Every idea, therefore, = god, but a particular god. 
 (35 [390]) 
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The gods are the ideas intuited in the real (35 [392]. Art and philosophy are thereby 
united in complementary fashion: “Whereas philosophy intuits (anschaut) . . . ideas as 
they are in themselves (an sich), art intuits them objectively (real)” (17 [370]). Stated 
from the standpoint of their creative activities, “just as philosophy presents the absolute 
in the archetype (Urbild) so also does art present the absolute in a reflex or reflected 
image (Gegenbild)” (16 [369]. Art is thus the “objective reflex” (objectiver Reflex) of 
philosophy (ibid). Art and religion, in turn, are united by an inner bond such that only 
religion can give art a poetic world; while only art can give religion an objective 
manifestation (8 [352]). And just as the creative processes of the artist and God are 
analogous, so too is the work of the artist and philosopher, and equally that of the 
philosopher and God: “Philosophy is thus within the phenomenal (erscheinenden) ideal 
world just as much the resolution (das Auflösende) of all particularity as is God in the 
archetypal (urbildlichen) world” (28 [381]). 
 The result of this outpouring of genius into a work of art is symbolism. The 
symbol is a feature of all true art, but myth and symbol have a special affinity for each 
other, and symbolism is what gives myth its peculiar power. In StI the symbol is plainly 
Schiller’s aesthetic idea, but it has already been transformed into the infinite informing 
the particular. (August Schlegel has generally been credited with suggesting the term to 
Schelling in the following year.)42 Schelling’s definition does not simply represent a 
romantic outbidding of Kant’s dictum that the aesthetic idea occasions much thought 
without any single thought being able to represent it fully, but is the direct consequence 
of his pantheism, together with his conflation of the creative activities of God and artists: 
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Besides what he has put into his work with manifest intention, the artist seems 
instinctively, as it were, to have depicted therein an infinity which no finite 
understanding is capable of developing to the full. To explain what we mean by a 
single example: the mythology of the Greeks, which undeniably contains an 
infinite meaning (einen unendlichen Sinn) and a symbolism for all ideas, arose 
among a people, and in a fashion, which both make it impossible to suppose any 
comprehensive forethought in devising it, or in the harmony whereby everything 
is united into one great whole. 
 (StI 225 [293-4]) 
 
In further anticipation of PdK, symbolism is already distinct from schematism, though 
not allegory, which is nowhere mentioned (StI 136 [182]; see below). In PdK, however, 
the three are set in explicit apposition. 
The symbolic, Schelling decrees in the latter essay, is a “synthesis of two 
opposing modes, the schematic and the allegorical” (PdK 45-6 [406-7]). Specifically: 
 
The representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the 
particular is intuited through the universal is schematism. 
That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal 
or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is allegory. 
 The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the 
particular nor the particular the universal, but rather where both are absolutely 
one, is the symbolic. 
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 (46 [407]) 
 
A potter, setting out to throw a pot, will have a schema of the object in mind. Nature, on 
the other hand, “merely” allegorizes; that is, it does not symbolize, because the particular 
organism points to the universal without actually being it (48 [410]). I assume that 
Schelling is being deliberately paradoxical here rather than merely clever in insisting that 
in symbol we have a double, complementary representation (Darstellung) that no longer 
represents (darstellt). Schematism and allegory are thus each other’s converse, qua 
indifference of the universal and particular, but remain transitive in pointing outside 
themselves, while the union of the universal and the particular in the symbol is treated as 
a synthesis of these two opposed modes of representation so that the signifying process 
becomes tautegorical. 
The symbol is thus intransitive and supersedes schematism and allegory by 
attaining the romantic ideal of autonomy. Such thinking lies behind the remark that: 
“Only in the perfected informing (Einbildung) of the infinite into the finite does the latter 
become something that exists and endures on its own power (etwas für sich Bestehendes), 
a being in itself (an sich selbst ) that does not merely mean or signify something else” (85 
[461]). This striving for autonomy is why allegory is repeatedly denigrated by romantic 
theorists, Schelling notably among them, although uncharacteristically among such 
theorists he grants allegory some standing in art. It is thus easy to turn myth into allegory 
by a reductive process in which its schematic dimension is overlooked (47-8 [409-10]). 
Indeed, his description of Vulcan attempting to rape Minerva “as the merely earthly form 
of art that seeks unsuccessfully to unite with the divine form of art” (43 [402]) is 
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impossible to distinguish from his definition of allegory. This would be to miss the very 
core of his argument, however: Vulcan is himself and earthly art, he does not merely 
represent such art, as in allegory. Heyne is thus pronounced wrong to claim that Greek 
myths were originally meant as allegory but that Homer “turned them into a kind of epic 
travesty, took them purely poetically, and came up with these pleasant children’s fairy 
tales he tells in the Iliad and the Odyssey” (47 [409]). Despite the potential superiority of 
art to nature herself in communicating the union of the absolute and particular within the 
particular, Schelling’s artistic symbol does not participate in the absolute itself: even 
though imagery such as the artist pouring his genius into his artwork might be taken to 
suggest otherwise, and even though Schelling’s symbol allows us to intuit transcendental 
reality, it is not itself transcendental. His favorite illustration of the symbol is, 
unsurprisingly, the pantheon of Greek gods: in Jupiter, for example, absolute power and 
absolute wisdom are united. But, he hastens to add, Jupiter does not mean this or is 
supposed to mean it: “This would destroy the poetic independence of these figures. They 
do not signify it; they are it themselves. The ideas of philosophy and the gods of art are 
one and the same, yet each is in and for itself what it is; each is a unique view (eigne 
Ansicht) of the same thing. None is there for the sake of another or to signify the other” 
(42 [400-1]. 
In contrast with his sophisticated theorization of the symbol, and despite his own 
portentous claims for a narrative genre created only decades earlier by Heyne, Schelling’s 
theory of myth is fairly conventional, combining enlightenment commonplaces with 
romantic notions such as are found in Schlegel’s Gespräch. For example, Schelling 
closely echoes Schlegel’s claim that, from the perspective of the contemporary artist, the 
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ocean of poetry is a chaos, but from that of the longue durée it is a unity: “only in the 
history of art does the essential and inner unity of all works of art reveal itself, a unity 
showing that all poetry is of the same spirit (Genius), a spirit that even in the antitheses of 
ancient and modern art is merely showing us two different faces (Gestalten)” (19 [372]). 
Like Schlegel, he advocates a modern return to mythology, and claims that each artist 
must create his own mythology, which can also include philosophy and physics (75 
[446]); but he also sees the course of human history as arcing away from and returning to 
the ocean of poetry and myth, drawing on the same imagery as in the Gespräch.43 He 
follows the romantic consensus, traceable to Enlightenment thinkers such as Fontenelle 
and Vico, that ancient myth is a response to nature and religious experience, these being 
to various degrees the same.44 Whereas experiencing sublime nature is the best 
restorative for the modern shrunken soul, in StI (138 [184]), Schelling asserts that myth 
preserves man’s earliest understanding of nature. In PdK, he says more vaguely that myth 
‘refers to nature’ (bezieht sich auf die Natur), and is a symbolism of nature (77 [449]). 
Echoing the romantic lament that man has become alienated from nature and can only 
experience it indirectly through the filters of knowledge, reason and the like, Schelling 
finds that Schiller’s modern, sentimental artist also stands between us and the described 
object; the ancient, naive artist, on the other hand, resembles Vico’s Giganti: “The 
character of naïve genius is total—not so much imitation of nature, as Schiller puts it, as 
attainment of reality. His object is independent of him and exists in and for itself” (93 
[473]). And as in Vico, this immediacy is a key to the superiority of ancient poetry over 
modern, though for Schelling this is achieved by the autonomy of the object, unmediated 
by the artist’s own feelings: 
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One can summarize the entire difference between the naïve and sentimental poet 
by stating that in the former only the object holds sway; in the latter, the subject 
steps forward as subject. The former appears unconscious concerning his object; 
the latter constantly accompanies his object with his own consciousness and 
makes us aware of this consciousness. The former is cold and without feeling 
regarding his object, just as is nature; the latter presents his feeling to us so that 
we may participate in it as well. The former displays no intimacy 
(Vertraulichkeit) with us; only the objects is related to us (ist uns verwandt), the 
poet himself flees us. The latter, by portraying the object, simultaneously makes 
himself its reflex. . . . Indeed, that which is actually the ultimate / strength of all 
poesy, that the poet allow the object itself to hold sway (walten), rouses modern 
sensibility to indignation (empört). 
 (92-3 [471-2]) 
 
As previously noted, this same insistence on autonomy led Schelling to stipulate that the 
symbol must be tautegorical or autarchic. 
 Myth is likewise a separate world “in which along the exotic plants of art are able 
to bloom and grow” (45 [406]); but unfortunately the modern world “has no self-enclosed 
mythology” (71 [442]). This is because modernity comprises a world of individuals while 
the ancient world was a collective that functioned as an individual: only under such 
conditions can myth “possess absolute objectivity” and become “a second world” (51 
[414).45 (We see here the converse of Ludovico’s claim in the Gespräch that myth, qua 
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unifying system of belief, is the prerequisite for great art.) Thus, true myth “is possible in 
and for itself only to the extent that it has developed (ausgebildet) into totality and 
represents the archetypal universe (das urbildliche Universum) itself” (50 [413]). The 
gods must also form a complete and self-contained system, “an organic whole, a totality, 
a world” (41 [399]). These ideas are intimately related. For in acquiring complete 
objectivity or an independent existence, poetry about the gods becomes mythology (45 
[405]. Indeed, Schelling’s chief theoretical innovation regarding myth is his systematic 
conflation of Greek myth, epic, art generally, history, philosophy, symbolism, and the 
Olympian gods. We already saw a move in this direction in Schlegel’s partial conflation 
of myth and poetry in the Gespräch, but Schelling takes the process much further; and an 
analogy should also be drawn to his earlier conflation of the creative activities of God, 
the artist and the philosopher. Thus, for example, Schelling defines art as the 
representation of the absolute with indifference of the universal and particular in the 
particular. Myth is the universal content of this representation and is therefore symbolic 
(45 [406]). Regarding myth’s relation to poetry, Schelling notes that: 
 
The ancients themselves designate mythology and—since it is one with Homer—
the Homeric poems as the common source of poesy, history and philosophy. For 
poesy is the primal matter from which all else issued, the ocean from which all 
rivers flow out and to which all flow back. 
 (52 [416]) 
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Indeed, as the first poet, Homer invented myth: “Mythology and Homer are one and the 
same; Homer was already involved in the first poetic products of mythology and was, as 
it were potentially present” (ibid). Thus, the reason the modern world has no self-
enclosed mythology is because it has no epic (71 [442]). The symbol is likewise equated 
with myth itself: “the infinite within the finite becomes symbolic and to that extent 
mythological” (80 [454]). And Schelling considers it “the principle for the entire 
investigation” that: “the ideas can be viewed (angeschaut) objectively or in reality and as 
gods, and . . . the world of ideas can accordingly be viewed as a world of gods. This 
world is the content or material of all poesy (der Stoff aller Poesie)” (78 [451]). The 
circle thus closes. 
 For a fully transcendental symbol, I turn in closing to Friedrich Creuzer, a 
professor of Classics at the University of Heidelberg from 1804 to 1845. In 1810 he 
published his hugely influential and controversial Symbolik und Mythologie der alten 
Völker, besonders der Griechen. As Dieckman notes, the first edition of the work has an 
introduction, omitted in later editions, which contains many of his most important ideas 
about the nature of myth and symbolism.46 Creuzer echoes many contemporary 
commonplaces about the symbol, including a clear echo of its Kantian origins:47 
 
For the symbol becomes significant (bedeutsam) and stimulating (erwecklich) 
precisely through that incongruence of its being (Wesen) with its form, and 
through the superabundance of its content in comparison with its expression.48 
Therefore the more stimulating it is (anregender), the more it causes us to think. 
 (68) 
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This is given a romantic inflection so that: “in the symbol a universal idea (allgemeiner 
Begriff) puts on earthly garb, and steps full of meaning before the eye of our soul 
(Geistes) as an image” (108). The symbol is thus tautegorical, a term Creuzer does not 
himself use: it is what it represents, and both is and represents (70).49 Creuzer also adopts 
a ‘degeneration’ model to the study of myth, arguing that an original monotheism 
degenerated into polytheism, symbolism degenerated into myth, and myth in turn 
degenerated for various causes, including literalization of metaphor. Antecedents to his 
model can be found in Bacon, Fontenelle, and Heyne; while his heirs include, the founder 
of comparative mythology, Max Müller, and Karl Jung, who imports transcendental 
assumptions into psychoanalytic approaches to myth. 
 Creuzer identifies as the source of myth not Greek poetry but the esoteric 
theology of Indian Brahmins. (Some version of his theory was inevitable following on the 
then recent decipherment of Sanskrit.) In a nutshell, Creuzer believed that the first men 
were Indian monotheists, who created symbols that concretely and directly expressed 
their experience of the mysterium tremendum in natural portents, especially cosmological. 
These irruptions of the divine into the phenomenal world were themselves symbolic, and 
as the divine infinite embodied in the finite, they were also transcendental. They are thus 
sublime and infinitely evocative, but for this very reason they remain highly enigmatic 
and require interpretation.50 In step the Indic priests, who communicate and elucidate 
their meanings with images in which the spiritual and material remain united, so that the 
spiritual is given concrete form: the transcendental symbol is thus a religious symbol.51 
The symbol is also amphibious, as a divine immanence that is accessible to reason, just as 
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and because the human soul is similarly amphibious (67-8). Above all, the symbol is 
instantaneous, pregnant with (religious) meaning, evocative, important, and loaded with 
affect.52 
 Armed with these symbols, these Indic priests spread through the ancient world 
teaching their esoteric doctrines. When they reached Greece, the inhabitants were still too 
primitive to be taught unmediated religious revelation.53 So, these Indic missionaries 
communicated and explained their symbols by telling stories (e.g. 109-10); myth is thus 
the narrative of the symbol, and in its Greek form becomes polytheistic. Narrativizing the 
symbol as myth also satisfied the Greeks’ longing to know the history of those they 
worshipped; and from myth the Greeks derived their religion, so that Greek polytheism is 
a degenerate form of Indic monotheism. The Mysteries and in particular Orphic poetry, 
however, preserved the memory of the original monotheistic religion, albeit in disguised 
form. In time, however, the Greeks would develop their own, plastic symbols in the form 
of sculpture, which is the highest art form mankind has ever achieved. For Creuzer, 
symbolism thus has three meanings, and stages of meaning, though our concern is with 
the symbolism that gave rise to myth. 
 With his concept of the symbol, Creuzer confronts head on a central problem in 
myth-theory that had remained unrecognized or avoided in the years since Kant 
discovered the aesthetic idea: the relation of the symbol to narrative. Up to this point, the 
nature of that relationship had remained remarkably vague, despite a general tendency to 
identify the aesthetic idea with a visual image and to inflate its evocative power from 
“much” to “infinite”: as a result it was possible to identify all of Greek mythology and the 
Bible as a single symbol.54 Creuzer, however, recognizes the discrepancy between the 
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romantic symbol and the diachronic dimension of narrative. As von Hendy puts it, the 
symbol “is visual, instantaneous, and involuntary. But myth is auditory, discursive, and 
intentional.”55 And as Todorov had observed ealier, “The symbol’s instantaneity is 
linked with the stress placed in the symbol on the process of production, with the fusion 
between the symbolizer and the symbolized, with the inability of reason to analyze and 
express the symbolized in any other way.”56 It is this very instantaneity that 
differentiates symbol from allegory (83-4).57 Creuzer’s symbol is thus primary even to 
language, while myth is secondary in more than one sense: it has become mere allegory 
of the symbol.58 Or, as Feldman puts it: “The Creuzerian symbol is the thing symbolized, 
where myth now only represents it. . .symbols overflow with meaning, where myth now 
can only discuss meaning.”59 Müller would subsequently take from Creuzer his historical 
model and linguistic assumptions. As a result, Creuzer would remain an important if 
mediated influence among comparative mythologists well into the twentieth century.60 
But Creuzer’s most important and wide-ranging influence lay in his theory of the 
transcendental and concrete symbol, which informs the psychological theories of Karl 
Jung, and from him Joseph Campbell, whose Jungian inspired monomyth remains 
enormously influential in popular culture. From that perspective it would not be wholly 
illegitimate to say that Creuzer is the spiritual ancestor of Star Wars. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
* Acknowledgments. A version of this essay was read and generously commented on by: 
Lowell Edmunds. All errors of fact and interpretation remain my jealously guarded 
possession. 
1 Kant 1781, 1787. 
2 Kant 1790, 1793. For the Kantian symbol, see esp. Adams 1983: 29-45. 
3 Kant 1793: 254-60 § 59. 
4 Kant 1951: 197 § 49 [=1793: 192-3]. Cf., e.g., Todorov 1982: 190; Adams 1983: 40; 
Schulte-Sasse 1988: 144; von Hendy 2002: 35. 
5 Welleck 1973: 338. 
6 González 2015 argues that the ability to perceive the universal in the particular is 
central to Aristotle’s aesthetic theory. 
7 Creuzer 1810: 47-8; 78. See Adams 1983: 17-20, who terms this type of symbolism 
‘miraculous,’ in contrast to ‘secular’ symbolism. 
8 For romantic allegory, see Adams 1983: 12-23. 
9 Schelling 1856a: 196 n. 
10 Todorov 1982: 201. 
11 For the falling out of Herder with Schiller and even Goethe, see Clark 1955: esp. 373-
81, 414-7. Friedrich Schlegel had a similar falling out with Schiller, whom he came to 
despise. 
12 In a pair of essays entitled: “Temporum mythicorum memoria a corruptelis nonnullis 
vindicate” (1763); and “Quaestio de caussis fabularum seu mythorum veterum physicis” 
(1764). The core of his position is articulated in Heyne 1764: 189-96; cited by Horstmann 
 49 
                                                                                                                                                 
1972: 72-4; partial German translation in de Vries 1961; 144-9; partial English translation 
in Feldman and Richardson 1972: 218-19. The word mythos first occurs in a German-
Latin dictionary dating to the first half of the sixteenth century; on which cf. Horstmann 
1979: 14. 
13 Graf 1993b: 287-8; von Hendy 2002: 2-3. 
14 On allegory and allegoresis, see, e.g., Whitman 1987; Graf 1993b: 285-7; Richardson 
1993: 25-49; Grafton, Most and Settis 2010: 34-41, s.v. “allegory.” 
15 For recent discussion of the evidence, see González, 2013: 156-63, who is skeptical as 
to how much can be said about Theagenes. Pàmias (2014) provides a brief history of the 
reception of myth from antiquity to Creuzer. 
16 ΣIl. 20.67 = DK 8.2; for strife as the governing principle of the cosmos in the 
Presocratics, c.f. e.g. Herakleitos DK 22B80. 
17 The title of an essay by Francis Bacon defending allegorical interpretations of myth: 
De sapientia veterum (1609). 
18 von Hendy 2002: 5, translating Fontenelle 1989: 202: “Ne cherchons donc autre chose 
dans les fables que l’histoire des erreurs de l’esprit humain.” 
19 See esp. de Vries 1961: 143-4; Feldman and Richardson 1972: 215-8; Horstmann 
1972; Graf 1993b. 
20 See esp. Berlin 1976 [2000]; cf. Zammito, Menges and Menze 2010, who rebut 
Berlin’s claim that Herder belongs to the “Counter-Enlightenment,” or proto-
Romanticism (667-70); on which see also Clark 1955: 417-8. 
21 Clark 1955: 162. 
22 Berlin 1976: 180-4. 
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23 The fundamental text is Herder 1784-91. 
24 Berlin 1976: 203. 
25 von Hendy 2002: 19-22. 
26 von Hendy 2002: 20. 
27 In the shorter edition of 1800, Schiller changed the line to read: “lebt’ in jenem 
Baum.” 
28 On Schlegel, the most complete and up-to-date account in English is by Millán-Zaibert 
2007; and for the Gespräch, see 160-75. 
29 E.g. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 1988: 83; Behler and Struc 1968: 45 also note the 
close relationship between the Rede and the Ideen. 
30 Behler and Struc 1968: 9 with n. 2. 
31 “Fantastischen” is glossed in a footnote with: in einer ganz durch die Fantasie 
bestimmten. 
32 Dieckmann 1959. 
33 Dieckmann, 1959: 282-3, emphasizes the mysticism of Schlegel’s later thought. 
34 Despite the obvious relevance of Spinoza to Schelling’s philosophy: cf. White 1983. 
Clark, 1955: 417, argues that “Without Herder’s energetic defense of Spinoza, the 
Romanticists would hardly have blended pantheism into their philosophy of religion and 
nature.” 
35 For Schelling, see esp. Adams 1983: 58-70; von Hendy 2002: 33-42. 
36 Vigus 2010: 16, 19. 
37 Dieckmann 1959: 276-7. 
38 See above, n. 7. 
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39  E. Cassirer 1977: 2.6-22; 1955: 2.3-16. 
40 Throughout this section, the first reference will be to the English translation, the 
second, bracketed reference to the German edition. 
41 His imagery here can be elucidated with Robinson’s essay to Madame de Staël on 
Schelling (2010: 126 § 3): “If the Universe be not a Sand hill but a System of beings, 
united into one whole, must there not be a sense to perceive it?” 
42 Todorov 1982: 198; von Hendy 2002: 35. 
43 Schlegel 1968: 60; see also below. 
44 Although now superannuated, this view continues to find adherents; cf. e.g. Scott and 
Marshall 2009: 497, s.v. ‘myth.’ 
45 In support of his position he claims Wolf had demonstrated that Homer “in his original 
form, was not the work of a single person, but rather of several individuals driven by the 
same spirit” (52 [415]). 
46 Dieckmann 1959: 278-9. 
47 Cf. also Creuzer 1810: 71. 
48 That is, the “Incongruenz” issues directly from the transcendental nature of the symbol 
with its union of the Platonic idea and the corporeal; on which cf. e.g. ibid. 66-8, 74-5. 
49 Cf. Todorov 1982: 206. 
50 Creuzer’s metaphor is “dunkel,” e.g. 1810: 69, 78, 110.  
51 For Creuzer’s historical model, see Dieckmann 1959: 280; de Vries 1961: 149-51; 
Feldman and Richardson 1972: 388; Graf 1993: 20-1; Williamson 2004: 127-9; Pàmias 
2014: 66-7. 
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52 E.g. Creuzer 1810: 70-1, 75, 78, 109-11 and with further references to the symbol’s 
instantaneity below at n. 57. 
53 de Vries 1961: 150. 
54 von Hendy 2002: 43. 
55 von Hendy 2002: 43. 
56 Todorov 1982: 218. 
57 For references to the symbol’s instantaneity, see e.g. Creuzer 1810: 4, 66, 69-71, 75, 
79. 
58 Feldman and Richardson 1972: 388; von Hendy 2002: 43. 
59 Feldman and Richardson 1972: 388-9. 
60 As recently as 1978, Douglas Frame could cite Müller without apology in an important 
book on the Odyssey published by Yale University Press. 
